A Theoretical Framework for Understanding the Criticism of Civil Society Transfer as an Enabling Condition for Democracy

Erin Crouch
Tallinn University

Prepared for:
European Research Network On Philanthropy Conference, July 9-10, 2015 Paris, France

Abstract

Civil society and democracy building has been an important focus in international philanthropy, yet its efficacy is constantly and unevenly challenged. This paper proposes a theoretical framework for examining literature critical of civil society transfer as an enabling condition for democracies in new or struggling states. It is found that the criticism takes place on four levels and a model is proposed for organizing these levels. In this framework, criticism can reference the *transferability* of civil society; the *appropriateness of nongovernmental organizations* as the vehicle for this transfer; the *process* by which the transfer is attempted; and finally, criticism of the *actual work* of the nongovernmental organizations. The framework is then used to examine three representative peer-reviewed journal articles in a case study of mid 1990s Russia and trends are analyzed. The strengths and weaknesses of the model, conclusions for funders and future directions are addressed in the conclusion.

"If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should run for my life."

Henry David Thoreau in *Walden*, 1854

In the current world order, nation states exist today that were not even dreamed of twenty years ago. These countries have weak or authoritarian governments, or systems unequal to the task of providing their populations with opportunities for self-expression or representation. Globalization means that these countries and their futures are not an experiment in a vacuum; their security is yoked to that of more stable states, who have an incentive to help them stand on their feet.

Civil society currently is considered a necessary part of a successful democratic state structure. Where it is lacking, it must be developed, and the instrument of nongovernmental organizations has been the tool of choice for leading Western countries. This axiom, however, is increasingly challenged today, inside and out of these new countries.

Criticism of the role played by civil society and the need for and work of democracy building comes from academics and thinkers in many schools. Politicians and professors alike pass judgement, but within the current literature, these missives lack a framework for understanding in context. Comparison between critical papers is difficult and a comprehensive understanding of problematic issues and trends is lacking.

This paper explores the current understanding of civil society and its historical underpinnings, the relationship between civil society and democracy, and nongovernmental organizations' current role in democracy building; it then proposes a theoretical framework for understanding the criticism of civil society-building efforts. Through the use of this framework, the body of literature critical of all aspects of civil society building and democracy building in newly independent or struggling countries will be more easily understood and compared. In the final section, the framework is used to examine three representative peer-reviewed journal articles in a case study of mid 1990s Russia and conclusions are drawn about major areas of contention and consensus among authors, with implications for funders.

What is Civil Society and What is its Role?

Civil society today is understood as "the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting, autonomous from the state and bound by a legal order or a set of shared rules," according to Larry Diamond, (1994), a view tracing its roots to liberal theory and Alexis de Tocqueville and Jean-Jacques Rousseau's idea of 'the people' as a force for good and a check on government power (p. 4).

It is a blurry concept: Seligman (1992) characterizes civil society as an exercise in the "sociology of knowledge," hypothesizing that the original eighteenth-century idea of civil society was built on a time when religion muted the "tension between public and private interests." Outside this specific political and religious context, the concept has taken on new meanings and importance, but at the price of losing its initial coherence (p.13) What we call civil society today is far from the unified concept that Rousseau had, a relic from a time when shared religion in a limited part of the world ensured homogeny.

Today's understanding of civil society as a *self-generating* force is different from theories that hold social order as a necessary outcome of economics, as in Realism, or as a force shaped by outside agency, as Rationalists view it. These two systems see social order as the result of individuals incentivized or rewarded by systems, and thus the shared norms central to civil society thinking are "literally ignored or taken as secondary features following from the workings of more fundamental, positivist concepts," (Karp & Sullivan, 1997, p. 20).

In the Realist perspective, use of state power is the ordering principle. Laws and authority figures set up structures of incentives for compliance and disincentives for non-compliance. Institutions, law, government, and organizations are in fact such structures of control (Karp & Sullivan, 1997, p. 20.) Rationalists, however, conceive of the individual as a source of desires or preferences, a calculator of their own advantage. Within the seeming randomness of human behavior, the underlying law of rational action is structuring the decisions made. What looks like an orderly society is "the result of patterns of cooperation which prove to 'pay off' sufficiently well over time and so come to structure individual choices into predictable, often complementary arrangements," (Karp & Sullivan, 20.) If Realists see society as performing in a ballroom dance competition, and Rationalists see it as break dancers busking for money on the corner, then the Liberal conception of civil society is a flash mob performing 'Thriller' (Jackson, 1983, track 4); that is, those with like-minded ideas come together spontaneously to build community.

Just as civil society is *related* to state power and individual desires but not *explained* by them, civil society ideally operates *through* and *with* both government and markets without being part of them. According to Karp & Sullivan (1997), one of the most important emerging debates "concerns how civil society is to be differentiated from the other social spheres yet remain connected to them, even in one sense, superior to them both." (p. 22)

Civil society cannot replace the state: the state is "both one association among others within civil society and at the same time it is the organization which frames and structures the very conditions for civil society." (Karp & Sullivan, 1997, p.26) In conclusion, in characterizing the difficulties in defining civil society, some quote U.S. Supreme Court Justice Potter Stewart's remark about obscenity: "I know it when I see it." (Setianto, 1997, quoting Levin, 1997, p. 109)

For the theoretical framework proposed in this work, the most cohesive structure is found within the Liberal conception. Liberalism emphasizes individualism and a plurality of views to provide counterbalance to governmental power, and is the predominant historical American theory; as the majority of both critics and funders of civil society are from the U.S., it is natural to examine the effects from this standpoint.

Civil Society and Democracy

Democracy, as the superior form of government for both the well-being of its citizens and for its fellow nations, is written into the charters of the United Nations and the foreign policy goals of the United States, the European Union and many other developed countries. How is the concept of civil society tied to that of democracy? According to Henderson, incorporating the ideas of Robert Putnam,

> "Civic groups are related to democratic stability in two ways. Internally, civic groups inspire habits of cooperation, solidarity, public-spiritedness, and trust. Externally, these networks then aggregate interests and articulate demands to ensure the government's accountability to its citizens. It is this dense infrastructure of groups, some argue, that is the key to making democracy work." (2002, p. 170).

Putnam (2002) finds that democratic institutions work well only when they are embedded in cultural and social contexts which are supportive of civic engagement. Effective democratic states need strong civil societies. The data also supports the theory that the strength of the civil society is an predictor of economic strength as well. (Karp & Sullivan, p. 21)

Civil society's role in creating enabling conditions for democracy can help explain its influence in world order in recent years.

> "Civil society organisations combine a non-profit with a non-governmental character. This enables them to overcome the structural constraints resulting in the failure of markets and states to satisfy social demands for specific goods and services, most typically in the areas of health, education and social welfare. Civil society thus plays a compensatory and supplementary role, contributes to the material output of democratic regimes and, as a result, increases their efficiency." (Forbrieg, 1998, p.4)

Yet, Forbrieg (1998) adds, "systematic explorations of the democratically dysfunctional aspects of civil society have so far been very rare in the scholarly literature." (p. 7) One can thus conclude that civil society is important to world politics and global governance, and there is a both a demand for and a dearth of critical analysis in the field. For a long and balanced look at the relationship between civil society and democracy, see the full work, "The Nexus Between Civil Society and Democracy: Suggesting a Critical Approach," (Forbrieg, 2002)

Criticism and Ramifications for Philanthropy and Funders

General criticism of the work of civil society exists and can even be considered a fairly substantial field. Works like "Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them:
Lessons from the Anti-NGO Movement," (Jenkins, 2012) are widely-cited classics in the field. Criticism of the general practices of democracy-building by civil society also exist, from many perspectives and ontologies. Yet these missives lack a framework for understanding in context. Comparison between critical papers is difficult and a comprehensive understanding of problematic issues and trends is lacking. A comprehensive framework supplies much-needed structure to the body of knowledge and allow for separation of 'work problems' and 'process problems' in civil society and democracy building.

Understanding the field is big business and vital to philanthropy. If one accepts that democracy is the optimal governing style and a key to development as suggested by Atwood, the question then emerges of how to create the enabling conditions for it. Today, the primary vehicle for international civil society and democracy building is the nongovernmental organization (NGO). Though NGOs now play an enormous role in international development, many of the world's best-known NGOs predate the emergence of the modern development industry. Save the Children Fund was founded in 1919 after the First World War. Oxfam- originally known as the Oxford Committee against the Famine- was established in 1942 to provide famine relief to Greek Civil War victims. CARE began by sending U.S. food packages to Europe in 1946 after World War II. In fact, NGOs had been active at the international level since the eighteenth century in Western countries, when national level organizations focused on the abolition of the slave trade and movements for peace (Lewis, 2010, p. 3)

From feeding the needy to providing many other kinds of services, nongovernmental organizations became widely recognized in international development and increased their numbers dramatically in the 1980s and 1990s (Lewis, 2010, p. 1). At around the same time in the United States, Ronald Reagan created the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and established democracy-promotion programs within the U.S. foreign aid infrastructure.

These two parallel developments- the growth of the NGO sector and the interest of the U.S. government in democracy promotion- merged over the next fifteen years, culminating in a 2006 memo to the Bush administration from Thomas O. Melia, then deputy executive director of Freedom House, suggesting that NGOs "think differently and have a different perspective and different analysis from the State Department," and that this pluralism in democracy building is helpful and necessary. He made a policy recommendation that "the ten major NGOs with a proven track record in the democracy promotion community should be provided with approximately $25 million in each of the next five years and permitted to decide how to use it…" (Melia, 2006, "Recommendations,").

Though Melia's recommendation was not fully funded, today international NGOs operating democracy-promoting programs are taken for granted in development work from the West. Between 1990 and 2008, USAID, the foreign aid branch of the U.S. government, alone has supported democracy programs in approximately 120 countries and territories with budgets ranging from tens of thousands to hundreds of millions of dollars (Goldstone, 2008, p. 19.) These programs and other funders' projects work on a broad range of models that defy simple comparisons, yet funders

purport to know what each country needs. Opining in an op-ed piece, the German Marshall Fund publication, a funder of initiatives to strengthen democracies around the world, writes:

> "To contrast two extremes, a socially homogeneous country like Tunisia, which seems to be embarked on transition to democracy and holds an economic frontrunner position, can benefit from a much more ambitious democracy-building program than Libya, which has gone through a civil war and needs to engage in state-building first," (Huber, 2012)

To test the validity of this statement, it would be valuable to examine the voices critical of these programs in both Tunisia and Libya. Many critics find fault with the actions or results of a variety of actors, while others focus on one particular aspect of civil society building as problematic. Because of this, it has been difficult to tell if any one aspect of civil society development has been criticized more often or more harshly than others, or to conceptualize the criticisms. It is unfair and heavy-handed to compare one piece's crude dismissal of democracy-building as a tool of Western propaganda with another's nuanced criticism of the disenfranchisement of local NGO partners, however much they are both 'critical.'

The use of this framework permits parsing of the criticism to a much greater level, allowing gradation of understanding and more level comparison between criticism of programs in different countries; analysing the NGO as a delivery tool for democracy-building programs in different countries should additionally prove valuable to scholars and funders alike. For a helpful counterpoint on the value and successes of the work of international NGOs, see Kekk and Sikkink's 1998 work on the subject.

Framework

The framework itself encompasses criticism on four levels and a model is proposed for organizing these levels. In this framework, criticism can reference the *transferability* of civil society; the appropriateness of nongovernmental organizations as the *vehicle* for this transfer; the *process* by which the transfer is attempted; and finally, criticism of the *actual work* of the nongovernmental organizations. Criticism in all theoretical approaches can be encompassed by the framework, though Realist criticism is likely limited to the outermost level. Because of the nested nature of the levels, criticism of the top or broader levels necessitates criticism of the lower levels;

however the reverse is not true. For example, it does not follow that criticism of the work of NGOs means that civil society is not transferrable; but a critical analysis that finds in civil society an idea unable to be successfully moved from one place to another will inevitably lead to criticism of one or more of the nested levels.

Multilevel frameworks, expanding from narrow to broad, have historical precedent in many fields outside of international relations, including perhaps most famously Urie Bronfenbrenner's ecological framework for human development. A developmental psychologist, Bronfenbrenner's framework was introduced in the 1970s and consists of five socially organized subsystems arranged as nested circles, with the smallest as "individual," and the largest as the "macrosystem." (Bronfenbrenner, 1977)

Critical Framework



The robustness of ecological frameworks in cross-discipline use is well known: see, for example Vinokurov et. al (2007) and their work on using an ecological framework to outline the translation process involved in an evaluation of the Department of State's International Visitor Leadership Program (IVLP) in Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Georgia.

To facilitate understanding, a more detailed description of each framework level follows.

Level 1: Is civil society transferrable?

Can civil society "spread" successfully, and does it lead to democracy? As defined by Diamond (1994) in the introduction, the notion that civil society must be self generating and that it springs from shared rules would seem to preclude a seamless transfer from one country to another. Sen and Waterman (2010) point out the loaded history of one group "civilizing" another (i.e., Puritans and American Indians) and declare that "in fundamental terms, what is fondly called 'global civil society' is therefore today arguably contributing to less democracy, not more." (excerpt 1.8)

The question of whether the product of internal motivations externalized as non-market actions can be moved wholesale to another society and retain its recognizability is a lingering one. Arato, for example, concludes that civil society must be securely institutionalized before becoming a key, long-term terrain of participatory politics (Arato, 2000); can something recently developed then become institutionalized quickly enough for democracy to take root?

Level 2: Are NGOs the appropriate vehicle for transfer?

NGOs have ability to generate what scholars call 'soft' law; while lacking the hard, law-making ability of the state, through campaigning, mobilization, advocacy, lobbying, agenda- setting, and negotiation they can make clear and significant changes. They also exist without clear lines of accountability, unlike corporate and government power. (Jenkins, p. 460-461) "This absence of formal accountability contributes to anxiety about or mistrust of the third sector, especially when its activities begin to cross national borders." (Jenkins, p. 462)

Donors choose to focus on NGOs rather than the population as the 'engine' of civic development because it would be physically impossible to design aid projects to involve the whole population; however, in terms of efficacy, choosing these organizations is "a gamble." (Henderson, p. 156)

NGOs are not unquestionably democratic, either. "In Doing Good? The Politics and Antipolitics of NGO Practices," (1997) it is found that "specific NGOs may move in either democratic or oligarchic directions, depending on their constituencies and their particular circumstances. NGOs may serve both as *extensions of regimes*… and as sources of *alternatives to such regimes*." (Fisher, p. 458) In other words, they may continue whatever practices the government currently has *or* provide alternative viewpoints- they are not natural carriers of representative democracy. Despite the predominant orthodoxy, NGOs are also not the only options for civil society building;

direct government to government pressure and even military involvement have also been utilized in pursuit of creating enabling conditions for democracy (see the Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI), the U.S. government's democracy promotion in the Middle East for example.)

Level 3: Does the process work?

Once a determination has been made to "send" civil society abroad, how is it to be done? Carothers (1998) terms the process followed by the United States in designing aid packages "institutional modeling": the host society is measured against the desired endpoints, with aid then provided to "fill the gaps" between the local society and the idealized Western model. His criticism of the process includes the idea that domestic political interests are not accounted for, nor are cultural norms in the regions (p. 85-92). Democratization processes and success for a country are reduced to a checklist, after which a country would be 'ready': competing political parties, free and fair elections, an independent judiciary, an effective public administration, independent media (1998, p. 98).

Wedel (2001) compared the initial Western concept of democracy building in the former Soviet Union as a conveyor belt, with information traveling one way, complaining that in reality, the process was more like "a series of chemical reactions," beginning with donor policies, and transforming with each sides' agendas, interests and interactions." (p. 8)

Institutional modeling can produce NGOs devoted to causes far from the daily needs of those they meant to serve: objectives focused on postmaterialist values of funders rather than the materialist concerns of domestically funded organizations, with grantmaking decisions made from Washington, D.C., not project locations (Henderson, 2002, p. 142, 151)

Level 4: Is the work itself done appropriately?

NGOs may stretch their mission to match funding opportunities or take on projects outside their capabilities in order to stay in business. They may lack necessary equipment or skills with local languages and cultures. "Mission stretch" has been the ruin of many organizations, according to an NGO consultant, because it doesn't allow for stable growth or actual fulfillment of the mission. (Henderson, 2002, p. 156)

NGOs may also choose their members and employees for personal reasons such as close family ties or connections, discourage membership to conserve resources or consciously copy a for-profit or corporate structure in their work.

This level of the framework is strongly influenced by the previous levels, with dysfunction traveling downward; if an NGO is the wrong vehicle for the process, the appropriateness of the work done suffers. Similarly, flaws in the process, such as donor policies that are out-of-touch with the local situation, lead to results that are poor or simply not relevant.

Case Studies: Russia in the 1990s

The idea that civil society is the 'key to democracy' was behind the mad rush for its introduction to the countries of the former Soviet Union in the early 1990s. The expectations of the Clinton administration of the rescuing role that civil society, democracy and nongovernmental organizations would play for Russia is well-documented (Mendelson, 2001, p. 70.) The metrics seemed simple: build or strengthen local organizations and groups, provide funding for their programs, and watch stability grow. The U.S. spent $2.7 billion on democracy building in Russia from 1992 to to 2012 (Barry & Herszenhorn, 2012), yet Russians' opinion of nongovernmental organizations and their work actually declined from 2004 onward (Moisov & Shubina, 2012, p. 5) These results generated many scholarly articles and much discussion, which continues to present-day, especially in light of Russia's return to authoritarian leadership and aggressive military action.

Using the framework developed, criticism of NGO democracy building in Russia through civil society development is cataloged from three seminal articles published in peer-reviewed journals on the topic:

Henderson's "Selling Civil Society: Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia," published in *Comparative Political Studies* in 2002;

Hemment's "The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, Western Aid and NGOs in Russia," published in *Anthropological Quarterly* in 2004; and

Ljubownikow, Crotty & Rodgers' "The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia: The development of a Russian-style civil society" published in *Progress in Development Studies* in 2013.

Article One: Selling Civil Society

In this work, Henderson uses a neoinstitutionalist framework to highlight what she terms the paradoxical results of foreign aid to foster civic development and directly examines differences between groups that had received foreign funding and those which had not.

She comes to one conclusion at the broadest level (transferability), voicing doubt that the full concept of civil society can be transferred: "…aid is best at fostering groups' abilities to perform civil society's external functions of advocacy and interest articulation, but it does relatively little to improve how these groups perform civil society's internal functions of developing networks of communication and trust." (2002, p. 164)

Her primary criticisms fall in the third category, that of the process of transfer. She notes the incentive structure of the "grant game" that Western donors set up to provide funding to local organizations hinders horizontal development; that the need for quantified results necessitates prioritizing short-term results over long and that competition for funding rewards splinter groups rather than a cohesive society. Decisions regarding project funding and execution are made outside the country. The consequences of foreign aid as a business mean that NGO careerists without a long-term stake in the results control the projects.

In the fourth category, that of the work done, she finds that the local groups "hoard information" and duplicate efforts, mimicking the Western corporate structure rather than taking on a structure natural for the organizations. Henderson hypothesizes that the problems in the fourth category are primarily generated through the perverse incentives from the process (third category.)

Her criticism notably lacks the second level, that is, questioning the utility of NGOs for the delivery of the desired result.

Article Two: The Riddle of the Third Sector

Basing her paper on nineteen months of ethnographic fieldwork, Hemment provides a discursive analysis of the prominence of the "third sector," as the field on nongovernmental activity is known in Russian and highlights contention within the context of three ethnographic case studies.

Hemment also finds fault with the idea that civil society can be wholesale transferred from one country to another, arguing, "The civil society that dissidents yearned for was a realm of citizen empowerment, of discussion and debate. The third sector is a far cry from this vision." (2004, p. 221)

The *process* of the transfer (level three) receives her harshest criticism. The funding mechanisms for Western aid "provide a structural and symbolic framework for elites," (2004, p. 2017) and create entrepreneurs instead of active citizens. Because the structure is externally promoted and installed and market logic is used rather than organic development, the desired result is not achieved.

Hemment (2004), like Henderson (2002), has no criticism for the concept of NGOs as the proper tools for the job, and she also finds the work done by them satisfactory. In fact, she finds that the activists she worked with "imaginatively deployed" (p. 236) the third sector and it "remains compelling" to local groups. "They have used it to make sense of losses endured, to generate new forms of symbolic and material wealth, and to make sense of some of the crucial realignments that characterize the post-socialist era: between state and society, money and morality," (p. 236) she writes in her conclusion.

Article Three: The State and Civil Society

In this article, three periods of civil society development are examined: Soviet times, civil society during the Yeltsin era and civil society under Putin/Medvedev. For comparison purposes, only the period under Yeltsin and the conclusions will be examined using the framework. The article refers to NGOs as "third sector organizations" or TSOs, those organizations which do "things that business and government are either not doing, not doing well, or not doing often enough." (Ljubownikow, et. al., 2013, p. 154) The authors (2013) find three factors constraining the development of civil society in post-Soviet Russia and deem them "the reasons for the continuous weakness of civil society." (p. 160)

The first reason is the large number of single issue groups, created by rapid democratization (a criticism of the 'working level,' level four) The second is difficulty in engaging with the broader public. Springing from "tight knit pre-existing family and friendship networks, which were hostile towards outsiders," these TSOs lacked popular support (again, a criticism at level four.) Finally, the limited availability of resources is cited as the constraint for civil society development; the "inappropriate distribution" of foreign aid ensured that the organizations remained disconnected from the public and the state (a criticism of the process, level three) (p. 159)

"Activists turned to foreign funding not because they agreed with the Western model of civil society but due to the lack of domestic resources… rather than addressing the developing social issues, TSOs engaged in advocacy work, for which neither appropriate channels nor demand within the wider public existed." (p.160)

Ljubownikow, Crotty & Rodgers (2013) note that educated elites quickly learned how to access money from foreign donors and that those donors provided support to the same organizations again and again, discouraging others from applying (p. 159)

The article concludes with a level one criticism: "the state now plays a dominant, directing and all-encompassing role with regard to civil society formation and development." and "[t]herefore, civil society *po-russki* [Russian-style] is distinctly different from Western civil society arrangements or statist arrangements of the Soviet period." "Russian- style civil society shows us the exploratory limits of traditional civil society perspectives and extends our understanding of civil society arrangements in democratizing contexts." (p. 163) The authors note despite a process of apparent democratization, a large division between state and society exists, with NGOs not occupying the crux of the 'hourglass' as had been hoped.

Conclusion

To paraphrase Dostoyevsky, all happy civil societies are alike, but each unhappy one is unhappy in its own way. The critiques of the work of civil society development exist on many levels and for many reasons and within the literature, but until now, there has been no organizational framework for understanding them in context. Many critics find fault with the actions or results of a variety of actors, while others focus on one particular problematic aspect. Because of this, it has been difficult to tell if any one aspect of civil society development has been criticized more often or more harshly than others, or to conceptualize the criticisms.

This work finds that the criticism takes place on four levels and a model has been proposed for organizing these levels, e.g., the *transferability* of civil society; the appropriateness of NGOS as the *vehicle* for this transfer; the *process* by which the transfer is attempted; and finally, criticism of the *actual work* of the NGOs.

Through application of the framework in the case study of three articles, trends in the literature emerge. One can summarize from the review that the authors are primarily critical of the very transferability of civil society and find the process by which the transfer was attempted to be the most problematic area. There is no consensus on the success or failure of the work of the NGOs

on the ground level. The role of NGOs as "delivery vehicles" for democracy building goes uncriticized in these pieces, indeed, it seems to pass without question in much of the critical work.

The implications for funders and philanthropy generally is two-fold: more empirical evidence on the transferability of civil society and the conditions under which it is (or is not) possible is needed (addressing the levels of transferability and process.) The need for evidence-based practices in democracy-building is profound.

Secondly, the role of NGOs as vehicles for cultivation of civil society and democracy building needs evaluation. What other options exist, and what is their efficacy in comparison? The causality links, e.g., the relationships between criticism of the process and criticism of the work and vice versa must be better understood. Funders choose NGOs to provide this service because they are the "least worst" option, but other tools are poorly understood. Too much time is spent criticising and problem-solving the *work* of NGOs, which is like saying the top of that iceberg looks dirty, let's clean it off while the boat approaches.

Shortcomings of the framework include the need to further study the interconnectedness of the levels and the subjective nature of determining in which level criticism falls. In the future, research directions could include level to level comparisons between geographical areas, or comparisons by a single funder in multiple areas of the world. It is the author's hope that this critical framework inspires additional work in this area and a new era of thoughtful, productive philanthropy ensues.

References

Abele, C. (2006). *Civil Society Assistance in Central and Eastern Europe The Cases of Poland and Slovakia* (Unpublished doctoral dissertation). Universität zu Berlin , Germany.

Allison, A., & Macinko, J. A. (1993). Series on Democracy and Health. Retrieved from: http://diseaseriskindex.harvard.edu/ihsg/publications/pdf/No-7-4.PDF

Arato, A. (2000). Civil Society, Constitution and Legitimation. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Bronfenbrenner, U. (1977). Toward an experimental ecology of human development. *American Psychologist*, 32, 513-531.

Buxton, C. & Konovalova, E. (2013) Russian civil society: history, today, and future prospects. Briefing Paper 37. Oxford, UK: Intrac. Retrieved from URL: http://www.intrac.org/data/files/resources/765/Briefing-Paper-37-Russian-civil-society-history-today-and-future-prospects.pdf

Carothers, T. (2011). Aiding democracy abroad: the learning curve. Carnegie Endowment.

Diamond, L.J. (1994) Toward Democratic Consolidation. *Journal of Democracy,* Volume 5, (3), pp. 4-17

Dobczansky, M. (2014). Russian Civil Society: A Critical Assessment. Retrieved from URL: http://www.wilsoncenter.org/publication/russian-civil-society-critical-assessment

Fisher, W. F. (1997). Doing good? The politics and antipolitics of NGO practices. *Annual review of anthropology*, 439-464.

Forbrieg, J. (2002) "The Nexus Between Civil Society and Democracy: Suggesting a Critical Approach" *Political Priorities between East and West. Europe's rediscovered wealth – What the accession-candidates in Eastern and Central Europe have to offer*. (No. 2. May 2002), pp. 79-103.

Forbrieg, J. (1998). The Nexus Between Civil Society and Democracy. *Sage*, 1-19.

Goldstone, J. A., et al. Improving Democracy Assistance: Building Knowledge Through Evaluations and Research. Technical report Committee on Evaluation of USAID Democracy Assistance Programs, National Research Council of the National Academies, 2008.

Hemment, J.D. (2004) The Riddle of the Third Sector: Civil Society, Western Aid and NGOs in Russia. *Anthropological Quarterly,* 77.2, pp. 215-241

Henderson, S. L. (2002). Selling Civil Society Western Aid and the Nongovernmental Organization Sector in Russia. *Comparative Political Studies*, 35(2), 139-167.

Henderson, S.L. (2003). Building democracy in contemporary Russia: Western support for grassroots organizations. Cornell University Press.

Hill, A. (2011) Global Governance Discourse: An analysis of its role and Impact on State Sovereignty. Retrieved from URL: academia.edu

Huber, D. (2012) Democracy Building since the Arab Spring: In Need of "Diversification" *Op-Ed Opinions on the Mediterranean*. Retrieved from URL: http://www.gmfus.org/wp-content/blogs.dir/1/files_mf/1342533255Huber_DemocracyBuilding_Jul12.pdf

Jackson, M. (1983). Thriller. Thriller [MP3 file].Westlake Recording Studios West Hollywood, California

Javeline, D., & Lindemann, S. (2010) A Balanced Assessment of Russian Civil Society. *Journal of International Affairs*. Volume 63, (No 2 Spring/Summer 2010) pp. 171-188

Jenkins, G. (2012) Nongovernmental Organizations and the Forces Against Them: Lessons from the Anti-NGO Movement. *Brooklyn Journal of International Law*, Vol. 37, (2)

Jordan, L. (2005). Mechanisms for NGO accountability. *GPPi Research Paper Series,* (3).

Karp, D. & Sullivan, W. M., (1997) The Idea of Civil Society: Scholarship and Debate. http://www.skidmore.edu/~dkarp/Karp%20Vitae_files/The%20Idea%20of%20Civil%20Society.pdf

Keck, M. E., & Sikkink, K. (1999). Transnational advocacy networks in international and regional politics. *International Social Science Journal,* 51(159), 89-101. Retrieved from URL: http://courses.washington.edu/pbaf531/KeckSikkink.pdf

Lewis, D. (2010). Nongovernmental organizations, definition and history. *International Encyclopedia of Civil Society* (pp. 1056-1062). Springer US.

Ljubownikow, S., Crotty, J. & Rodgers, P.W. (2013)The state and civil society in Post-Soviet Russia: The development of a Russian-style civil society. Progress in Development Studies 13: 153.

Mendelson, S.E. (2001) Democracy Assistance and Political Transition in Russia: Between Success and Failure. *International Security,* Volume 25 (4), pp. 68-106

Moisov, V. & Shubina, L. Research Group TsIRKON. (2012) Otnosheniya Rossiyan k Uzhestocheniyu Zakona o Nikommerchiskikh Organizatsiyakh [The Attitude of Russians Towards the Law on NGOs Becoming More Stringent], p.2

Mooney, P. (2006 August 1) How to Deal With NGOs – Part I, China. *YaleGlobal.* Retrieved from URL: http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/how-deal-ngos-%E2%80%93-part-i-china

O'Dwyer, B., Unerman, J. (2006). On James Bond and the importance of NGO accountability. *Accounting, Auditing & Accountability Journal*, Vol. 19 (3), pp. 305 - 318

Setianto, B.D. (1997) Somewhere In Between: Conceptualizing Civil Society, *International Journal of Not-for Profit Law*, 10(1), 109-20 Retrieved from: https://www.globalpolicy.org/component/content/article/177-un/31603.html

Seligman, A. (1992). Idea of Civil Society. Simon and Schuster.

Sen, J. and Waterman, P (2010) Engaging Critically with the Reality and Concept of Civil Society. *Worlds of Movement, Worlds in Movement.* Volume 4 Retrieved from URL: p2pfoundation.net/Engaging_Critically_with_the_Reality_and_Concept_of_Civil_Society

Vinokurov, A., Geller, D., & Martin, T. L. (2007). Translation as an ecological tool for instrument development. *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*, 6(2), Article 3. Retrieved 20 May 2015 from http://www.ualberta.ca/~iiqm/backissues/6_2/vinokurov.pdf

Wedel, J.R. (2001). *Collision and Collusion: The Strange Case of Western Aid to Eastern Europe* Retrieved from URL http://books.google.ee/

Wieclawski, J. (2011). Contemporary Realism and the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. *International Journal of Business and Social Science*, 2(1), 171-173. Retrieved from URL: http://ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._1;_January_2011/16.pdf